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Abstract 
This paper describes how to carry out a feasibility study for a 
potential knowledge based system application. It discusses factors to 
be considered under three headings: the business case, the technical 
feasibility, and stakeholder issues. It concludes with a case study of  a 
feasibility study for a KBS to guide surgeons in diagnosis and 
treatment of thyroid conditions.  
1. Introduction 
Many years of experience have demonstrated that knowledge based systems (KBS) 
are one of the most effective methods of managing knowledge in organisations – if 
they are applied in appropriate areas and to appropriate tasks. The identification of 
appropriate tasks and areas is therefore critical – and yet little has been published on 
this subject, despite renewed interest in the area from knowledge management 
practitioners. The purpose of this paper is to outline an approach to conducting 
feasibility studies for knowledge based systems.1 
There are three major aspects to consider when carrying out such a feasibility study: 
the business case; technical feasibility; and project feasibility (i.e. involvement and 
commitment of the various stakeholders). These will be considered in turn. The 
paper will then conclude with a case study, illustrating these principles being put 
into practice. 
2. Feasibility Studies: The Business Case 
If a KBS is not expected to bring business benefits, then there is no point in an 
organisation investing in its development, so the business case must be part of any 
feasibility study. That much is obvious; what is less obvious is the types of business 
benefit that a knowledge based system can bring to an organisation. 
                                                         
1 Acknowledgements are due to the following: Ian Filby (for general knowledge engineering 
contributions), Knox Haggie (for the case study), Robert Inder (who coined the “telephone 
test”), Ann Macintosh (for managing and marketing the training course that drove the 
development of these ideas) and Neil Molony (domain expert for the case study). The case 
study was supported by EPSRC grant number GR/R60348/01, “Master’s Training Package 
in Knowledge Management and Knowledge Engineering”.  
The most obvious business benefit is increased productivity, which KBS systems 
may deliver by reducing the time taken to perform a problem solving task. 
However, this is rarely the initial motivation for building a knowledge based system; 
the reasons are normally to do with the need for a knowledge management solution 
– that is, some operation within the organisation requires expertise, and the 
expertise is either not available often enough, or not exercised fully. The most 
common problem with expertise is that it is not available widely enough. The 
experts may be simply too busy to answer all the queries which require their 
expertise; alternatively, the experts may be frequently employed on routine cases 
that do not optimise the use of their scarce expertise. A good example of the latter 
arose within Ferranti several years ago, when Alan Pridder, one of their staff was 
tasked with analysing core dumps from military software that had crashed. He 
became so fed up with poring over mountains of printout, only to find out that 
someone had kicked the plug out again, that he threatened to resign unless Ferranti 
did something about it. Their solution was to build a knowledge-based system based 
on his knowledge that could identify the most common causes of core dumps, thus 
leaving him with the more interesting cases; the process of having his knowledge 
elicited was also considered to be an interesting diversion. The resulting system, 
known as APRES (the Alan Pridder Replacement Expert System) was sufficiently 
successful that he was still working for Ferranti several years later. 
There are also situations where the best expertise is not applied to the problem, 
usually because of time restrictions; a KBS can provide support in making the best 
decision. A good example of this is American Express’ Authorizer’s Assistant 
system [1], which helps to decide whether transactions can be charged to an 
American Express card. This is necessary because American Express is a charge 
card, not a credit card, so the effective credit limit varies according to an 
individual’s credit history, use of the card, and several other factors, rather than 
being a fixed limit. Transactions on the borderline of acceptability are processed by 
“authorizers” whose task is to discuss the transaction with a retailer by telephone, 
look up the customer’s credit records, and then make a decision, all in about 90 
seconds. The transaction may be granted, rejected, or the card may even be 
destroyed by the retailer. American Express noticed that some of their authorizers 
performed much better than others, and so decided to implement a KBS to make 
the knowledge of the best authorizer available to all others. The project was a major 
undertaking, but when successfully completed, it saved far more money from the 
improvements in decision making than from the small reduction in the time required 
to process each authorisation. 
Other cases where improvements in decision making are required include cases 
where ‘experts’ disagree (in which case the most senior expert or manager may 
want to use the KBS to enforce the approach s/he considers best), and cases where 
there is no real expert. An example of the latter can be found in a system developed 
by a telecommunications company for diagnosing faults in a new switching system; 
the system did not exist beyond its paper specifications, so there was no-one with 
any expertise in diagnosing it! The company’s solution to this was to build a model-
based reasoning system that could reason from first principles. 
There are also further business benefits that may arise from developing a KBS. 
These may include training of users when they ask for explanations of the system’s 
decisions; it has been shown that providing training to someone when they need to 
know the answer is a very effective training technique. Management information can 
also be derived from the workings of the KBS. The organisation may obtain a 
profile as a user of high technology. One advantage that should definitely not be 
overlooked is that when an expert is getting close to retirement; the KBS can act as 
an archive of some or all of the expertise. This approach was used by Campbell’s 
when the expert who diagnosed faults in their giant soup cookers came up to 
retirement; the expert was described as “slightly bemused that his life’s experience 
had been encapsulated in about a hundred rules”.  
It is sensible to perform a full cost/benefit analysis, taking into account costs of staff 
training (to develop the KBS and to use it), hardware and software, and KBS 
maintenance. As an example, consider ICL’s Advanced Coating Plant Advisor, a 
system for diagnosing faults and advising on recovery of a particular manufacturing 
plant. In a DTI-sponsored study of this system [2], it was determined that the 
system had cost £30K to develop (6 man months at a notional rate of £50K per man 
year, plus £5K for hardware and software) plus an annual charge for knowledge 
base maintenance of about £5K (1 – 3 man days per month). The benefits were in 
reduced downtime of the plant (the plant was now online for 95% of the time rather 
than 92.5%), saving £100K per year; there were also far fewer calls on the expert, 
cutting his workload by about 80% (equivalent to £50K x 0.8 = £40K per year). So 
the system paid for itself in 3 months – and rolling out the system to other plants 
would multiply the benefits.  
2.1 Organisational feasibility 
For a successful feasibility study, it is not sufficient to establish that a KBS could 
bring benefits to an organisation; it is also important to ensure that the system fits in 
with the organisation’s current or future ways of working. If this criterion is not 
fulfilled, the system is unlikely to be used after a short period of time. 
The most important requirement is to determine how much organisational change 
will be required in order for the system to be used. It is inevitable that the 
introduction of a KBS will bring about some organisational changes -- typically 
some authority will be devolved from the experts to more junior staff. Techniques 
for handling changes like this are described in the section on Project Feasibility 
below. However, a KBS that requires major changes in authority or structure is 
unlikely to be used unless these changes are being carried out independently. A 
good example of this comes from one of the UK’s savings banks, which set up an 
AI group in the 1980s. The AI group asked for suggested KBS applications from 
staff, and spent a lot of effort on making a good choice. The final choice was to 
build a KBS to support the task of mortgage application assessment. Technically 
and commercially, this was a good decision -- other financial institutions have 
successfully built KBS to address the same task. However, once the system was 
built, tested, and demonstrated (successfully), it became clear that the system would 
be most useful if used by staff in the bank’s branches to make good mortgage 
lending decisions. This would require the bank to devolve its mortgage processing 
from 6 regional centres to 16,000 branches - a major organisational change which 
would require considerable redeployment of staff within the regional centres. As a 
result, the system was quietly shelved. 
Another organisational issue is whether the task will continue to be performed. It’s 
reasonably obvious that, if a piece of machinery is obsolete and will soon be phased 
out, it’s pointless to build a KBS to diagnose faults in that machine. However, the 
longevity of some organisational roles and functions is sometimes less obvious. In 
practice, it’s often easy to spot tasks that will continue to be performed, because 
they deal with the core of the business, or because there will always be a need for 
these tasks; in other cases, it’s worth making enquiries among management if this 
task is expected to continue for 3-5 years, which is the typical lifetime of an 
(unmaintained) KBS. 
One enquiry that is often useful is “Have you tried any other solutions to this 
problem? If so, why did they fail?” This is a good way of finding out about any 
organisational resistance to restructuring or to new technology, which may have a 
significant effect on the feasibility of the system. It’s also possible that other 
automated solutions have been tried; enquiring about the reasons for the failure of 
these can provide illuminating technical information. For example, Barclaycard’s 
Fraudwatch system, which monitors Barclaycard transactions to detect spending 
patterns indicative of possible fraudulent use, was originally implemented using a 
non-AI computing approach. The reason for failure of this system was that the 
pattern matching algorithm was not specific enough; with about 100,000 cards 
being used every day, this system would identify up to 1,000 cards with possible 
fraudulent transactions, which was far too many for Barclaycard to follow up. The 
current Fraudwatch system identifies far fewer cards, allowing Barclaycard to 
telephone many of the card holders and ask if the card is indeed being used 
fraudulently; if so, the card is cancelled immediately. This system identified 11 
frauds in its first 7 days of use, saving Barclaycard an average of £400 per card. 
Once a KBS is installed, the effects of knowledge transfer and knowledge seepage 
may occur. Knowledge transfer occurs when the KBS has an explanation facility 
which has a training effect upon the users; the users eventually learn all the 
knowledge embodied within the system. This effect was observed in the American 
Express Authorizer’s Assistant system, where the use of the explanation facility by 
new users was monitored. At first, the users accepted the system’s recommend-
ations with little interest in the explanations. After a while, they began to look at the 
explanations frequently; after some more time, they ceased to look at the 
explanations, having presumably learned everything that the explanations could tell 
them. It’s possible that users may cease to use the system at this stage. A solution to 
this problem (if it is a problem) is to build a KBS that supplies other benefits of 
automation; the Authorizer’s Assistant, for example, performs fast pattern matching 
on a database of credit records.  
Knowledge seepage occurs when all human expertise in the area is gradually lost as 
the experts and users become dependent upon the system. This is most frequently 
encountered in AI systems with adaptive capabilities that update their own 
knowledge (e.g. neural networks), but may also occur with highly complex KBS. 
This may be a significant risk to the organisation, particularly in a commercial 
climate where reorganisations are frequent and far-reaching. Feasibility studies 
should therefore use the technique of identifying “risk factors” and assessing the 
impact on the project if these factors should change. For example, the departure of 
a particular expert who has supplied knowledge for a KBS might be of medium 
likelihood, but have only a low impact on the project, because knowledge in this 
domain is very stable. It is wise to build in contingencies to the project plan if there 
are several risks with both medium/high likelihood and medium/high impact.   
 
3. Technical feasibility 
3.1 Task & knowledge 
When assessing the technical feasibility of a proposed system there are various 
issues to consider. The key one – indeed, this is often the first question asked in a 
good feasibility study – is the type of task being tackled. KBS have been used to 
perform a variety of knowledge-based tasks, such as classification, monitoring, 
diagnosis, assessment, prediction, planning, design, configuration and control tasks. 
If the task type is not in this list, it is worth asking if it is not more suited to being 
implemented using non-KBS techniques; for example, a task that primarily involves 
correlation is better suited to a statistical package than to a KBS. 
The form of knowledge is also important in technical feasibility. If the reasoning 
involved is primarily symbolic reasoning based on concepts, objects or states, then a 
KBS should be suitable. If there is a significant requirement for calculation, based 
on numerical data; or a requirement for geometric reasoning, based on graphical 
data; or (worst of all) a requirement for perceptual input, based on textures, shapes, 
photographs or facial expressions, then it will be difficult to program a KBS to 
perform all the necessary operations. Alternative approaches to consider might 
include CAD packages or computer-based training for humans. 
It is often obvious to a knowledge engineer when perceptual input is required, 
because textbooks or training materials will contain many photographs. However, a 
good heuristic to determine if any non-symbolic knowledge is required is the 
“telephone test”. It requires the knowledge engineer to ask the expert if, in an 
emergency, the solution to the problem could be described over the telephone. If the 
answer is “No”, or “It would take a very long time”, it’s likely that non-symbolic 
knowledge is involved. 
There are some types of knowledge that are definitely suitable for a KBS, and less 
suitable for other approaches. If the knowledge contains procedures, regulations or 
heuristics in the form of condition-action statements (If A is true then do B), a 
taxonomic hierarchy, or a set of alternatives which need to be searched through, 
then knowledge-based systems are probably the most suitable technology for 
automating this task. Also, if there is any uncertainty about the knowledge (either 
knowledge which has confidence factors attached to it, or knowledge which is 
assumed to be true based on continued belief in other knowledge) then KBS 
technology has techniques for representing this uncertainty that other technologies 
do not explicitly support. 
A feature that KBS are known to provide well is providing explanations. The 
explicit representation of knowledge in modular units (i.e. rules or objects) allows 
the knowledge engineer to attach explanations to individual rules or objects. 
Explanations are useful both for checking the accuracy of the system’s decisions 
and, as described above, for providing on-the-job training. From a commercial 
viewpoint, the ability to provide good explanations is one of the most useful 
features of KBS technology. 
Another point which should be included in the feasibility study is to make sure that 
the knowledge in the KBS is verifiable. In other words, there needs to be an agreed 
way of checking that the knowledge is correct. This can present quite a problem, for 
if there is only one expert in a task, who is to say whether the knowledge provided 
is correct or not? In practice, this is rarely a major problem in the commercial 
world; perhaps this is because of a greater emphasis on knowledge that achieves the 
correct result than on knowledge that is provably correct. A knowledge engineer 
should make sure that the manager funding the project either agrees that the 
expert’s opinions should be considered to be correct, or supplies an alternative 
“knowledge standard” against which checking can take place. 
While discussing verifiability of knowledge with the appropriate manager, it’s a 
good idea to continue to determine what proportion of the task the system should 
tackle. In other words, when is the project considered to be finished? If this is not 
specified at the outset, then it’s common to find all sorts of extra features or 
knowledge coverage being requested; if it is specified at the beginning, the 
knowledge engineer has a clear definition of a successful system. The chief difficulty 
is that early knowledge acquisition often reveals information about the task and its 
complexity that affects the definition of success considerably. It’s therefore wise to 
do one or two knowledge acquisition sessions before settling down the definition of 
a successful system. 
3.2 Application complexity 
Having looked at the task and knowledge to decide whether this problem is feasible 
for a KBS solution, it’s also important to look at how complex the proposed KBS 
solution would be, for these systems vary widely in levels of complexity; the amount 
of effort required to implement a commercial KBS can vary from a few weeks to 
many man years.  
A good heuristic for initial estimation of the task complexity is based on the task 
type. Some task types (principally diagnosis and assessment) are well understood 
and underlie many KBS applications; others (e.g. planning, design and control) only 
support a few applications, which are typically complex systems. Task types can be 
divided into analytic tasks such as diagnosis, classification, monitoring and 
assessment (where there is a finite number of solutions) and synthetic tasks such as 
planning, scheduling, configuration and design (where there is a theoretically infinite 
number of solutions); the knowledge engineer’s heuristic is that analytic tasks are 
typically less complex than synthetic tasks. This is only a heuristic, however; 
compare MYCIN, CASNET and INTERNIST, which all have the same task type 
(diagnosis) and the same general domain (medicine), but have very different levels 
of complexity. 
Another feature worth checking to determine the complexity of the task is the time 
required by experts to do it. Opinions vary on this, but ideally the expert should take 
between 3 minutes and 1 hour to solve the problem. If the expert takes less than 3 
minutes, then it will be difficult to build a KBS that accepts a meaningful amount of 
input and solves the problem as quickly as the expert; American Express managed 
it, but that was a million-dollar project. If the expert takes more than an hour to 
solve the problem, then it may be that the problem has many sub-components, and it 
would be better to begin by implementing a KBS to tackle one of the component 
tasks. 
The biggest potential time sinks in any project are the interfaces. Interfaces may 
take up to 80% of the code for the whole system, and will take up 10-50% of the 
project time. If the application requires several interfaces to other systems (e.g. 
databases), or if an impressive-looking user interface is required, then the 
knowledge engineer should make allowances in the project budget for 30-50% of 
the effort to be spent on interfaces. If the client will be content with an embedded 
system or a simple mouse-and-menu interface, then 10-15% is more realistic. 
Another factor that greatly affects complexity is criticality. If it is critical that the 
system’s answers are always correct and provide 100% coverage of the domain (for 
reasons of safety, or because there is the risk of significant loss of money, etc.) then 
the development process will require much more effort. The “80/20” rule states that 
building a system with 80% coverage (and 100% accuracy) takes 20% of the time 
required to build a system with 100% coverage, so it’s sensible to aim for 80% 
coverage if that is acceptable. 
Looking at the knowledge again, it isn’t sufficient to determine if the knowledge is 
symbolic or not. Certain types of knowledge may be represented as concepts, 
objects or states, but may still be very complex for a KBS to reason with. These 
include temporal knowledge (time-based orderings or time restrictions), spatial 
knowledge (e.g. the location of a desk relative to a door in an office layout 
problem), cause-effect reasoning at a ‘deep’ level (e.g. encoding the laws of physics 
and using them to make predictions), or a requirement to process real-time data 
inputs. There are existing KBS systems which work with each of these types of 
knowledge, so none of them make a KBS infeasible, but they do increase the 
complexity of the task. However, if common-sense reasoning is required, then a 
KBS is likely to have severe problems. Intelligence and common sense are not the 
same thing, as many parents of intelligent children will tell you, and without a huge 
“life knowledge” database, which is beyond the current scope of KBS technology, 
KBS cannot perform common sense reasoning.  
The final factor to consider is validation; that is, judging if the system gives the 
correct answers based on the knowledge put into it. This can be difficult to do in a 
live situation, because the correctness of some systems (e.g. loan advisory systems) 
cannot be judged by their results until years later. The accepted practice is to devise 
a test suite based on past cases of problem solving, and to make sure that the KBS 
produces the correct answer for each of these. It’s wise to ask the client to agree to 
the adequacy of this test suite, since conformance to the test suite will be a 
significant factor in defining a successful system. 
Just as with the business feasibility, there will be risk factors that might affect the 
technical feasibility of the KBS. These should be identified, with high-likelihood 
high-impact risks being noted in the feasibility study, and contingency plans made. 
 
4. Stakeholder issues 
Stakeholder issues – getting involvement and commitment from all parties involved 
with the system – is often considered the last important area in a feasibility study. In 
practice, however, more systems fail to be used because of project factors than for 
any business or technical reasons. The stakeholders involved will be management, 
users, developers, and the experts whose knowledge is being used in the system; 
these will be considered in turn. 
4.1 Management 
Management must agree that the feasibility study is adequate, must be willing to 
fund the system and make key personnel available throughout its development, and 
should support any organisational changes required to introduce the system. Some 
organisational change is inevitable, but if the organisational changes are small (e.g. 
devolving authority for routine problem solving from the expert to junior staff or an 
autonomous system) and well-justified (explanations of the KBS’ reasoning can 
help here), then the changes can be made easier by allowing the expert a monitoring 
role. If the system is being introduced as part of a deliberate organisational change, 
it is up to management to ensure an adequate role (and adequate support) for the 
KBS in the new structure. 
4.2 Users 
Users must be willing and able to use the system. The ability to use the system can 
be ensured through training - typically a day’s training for one or two people from 
each user department is sufficient, though training for all users is (of course) ideal. 
Willingness to use the system is sometimes more difficult to create; giving the users 
increased authority via the system may be a sufficient incentive, but it’s most 
important that the users understand the justification for the system. An example can 
be found in a system built for police patrol officers in Ottawa to help with 
identification of patterns in residential burglaries [3]. The system required patrol 
officers to spend more time collecting data than they had done previously, so there 
was a risk that they might not use it. The knowledge engineers handled this by 
giving the patrol officers slightly more authority (they were permitted to close some 
cases, rather than referring everything to detectives) and also by giving a 2-hour 
presentation to all patrol officers in which 90 minutes was spent explaining the 
justification for the system, and half an hour on how to use the system. The 
knowledge engineers also demonstrated their own commitment to the project by 
giving these presentations at 5am, which was the only time when significant 
numbers of patrol officers could be spared from policing duties! 
4.3 Developers 
The KBS developers need to know how to do knowledge acquisition, how to build 
KBS in a structured manner, and how to use the chosen programming tool. The 
best way to deal with this is to choose a tool that the developers already know well. 
Any deficiencies in developers’ abilities can be remedied by sending them on 
training courses, which should be built into the cost/benefit analysis of the project. 
4.4 Experts 
For the expert, the issues that might arise are as follows: 
• The expert may be senior to the knowledge engineer; 
• The expert may be uncomfortable with describing his job verbally; 
• The expert may be too busy to spend time with the knowledge engineer; 
• The expert may perceive the system as a threat to his job security; 
• The ‘expert’ is not really an expert at all. 
The first two issues can be handled by starting knowledge acquisition with 
techniques that the expert is comfortable with (e.g. interviews) rather than 
techniques that are most beneficial to the knowledge engineer (e.g. card sorting). If 
the expert is very busy, it is important to ensure that knowledge is available from 
some alternate source, whether it be lesser experts, manuals, previous cases of 
problem solving, so that meetings with the expert can be kept to a minimum. The 
‘threat’ issue can be handled by building an “80/20” system, thus retaining an active 
role for the expert; by giving the expert authority over maintenance or knowledge 
updates to the system; or by choosing an expert who is about to retire, when this is 
no longer an issue. The issue of non-expert experts is a difficult one, because there 
is a significant risk that the knowledge engineer will make himself very unpopular by 
exposing this; some quiet words with an sympathetic senior figure in the client 
organisation might result in a change of expert, or a change of focus for the KBS. 
4.5 Other project issues 
An issue that is of great significance for KBS is maintenance. Although the 
knowledge within KBS is often easier to maintain than the code in many other 
computing systems, many knowledge-based applications require the knowledge to 
be updated much more frequently. For this reason, systems that have fast-changing 
knowledge (such as help desks for rapidly changing products such as computer 
hardware or software) are often based on case-based reasoning, which combines 
aspects of knowledge-based and adaptive technologies. For a KBS, the knowledge 
engineer should ensure that the feasibility study considers knowledge maintenance, 
and encourages management to select someone capable of knowledge maintenance. 
A good solution is to give the expert himself enough training that he is able to 
understand the knowledge base himself; he can then take on responsibility for 
knowledge maintenance, even if he does not do the actual programming.  
 
5. Case Study: An Internet-based Clinical Protocol 
The preparation of a feasibility study will be illustrated by referring to a case study 
of the development of systems to support doctors in using clinical protocols via the 
Internet. The protocols are for treatment of thyroid problems, and the system for 
which this study was prepared has recently been developed to prototype level for 
New Cross Hospital in Wolverhampton. The technical approach used is similar to 
that described in [4]. 
Medicine was one of the earliest application areas for knowledge-based systems: the 
MYCIN system [5], which recommended antibiotics based on clinical data was the 
first commercially viable KBS to be produced. Since then, KBS have been 
introduced throughout the medical field; today, systems can be found in routine use 
in areas such as managing ventilators in ICUs [6], hepatitis serology [7], clinical 
event monitoring (based on the Arden syntax) [8; 9], diagnosis of dysmorphic 
syndromes [10], CSF interpretation [11], and other areas [12].  
All these KBS examples are from the practice of medicine or anaesthesia; in many 
surgical specialties, sharing and re-use of knowledge in many medical fields is still 
limited to the dissemination of experiences and distilled knowledge by the traditional 
approaches of seminars, journals, and practical training. However, there is a 
growing trend to promote "best practice" within a specialised area through the use 
of clinical protocols. The idea is to provide guidelines based on strong scientific 
evidence. Protocols at present exist as intra-department guidelines for the 
management of clinical situations; where they exist, it is expected that they will 
normally be adhered to unless there is a good counter-argument. They are 
principally used to benefit sub-consultant grades. There are as yet only the 
beginnings of formalised nationally agreed protocols (e.g. those published by the 
Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network). They are usually printed sheets rather 
than computer-based, with copious references to the published clinical studies that 
justify each recommendation.  
This feasibility studies considers development of a system that will assist clinicians 
in following clinical protocols for the diagnosis and treatment of thyroid-related 
conditions. The systems will reason about the weight of available evidence (in the 
form of published clinical trials), and will also provide access to relevant 
publications if requested. The expected users are surgeons who would normally 
make use of a written protocol, and who will make the final decision on whether to 
follow the system’s recommendations.  
5.1 Business Case 
The heart of the business case lies in improving decision making by automating the 
protocol, making it easier for surgeons to follow (or seek justification of) its 
recommendations. This can achieved by encoding details of the published clinical 
studies and reports that justify each step, together with a measure of the reliability 
(see [13]) of each study. These measures could then be combined to produce 
qualified recommendations.  
The system would also have associated benefits in providing on-the-job training. If 
the system is regularly updated (and the beauty of an Internet-based system is that it 
only needs updating on one computer), then all users of the system will be made 
aware of new studies in the field which support or supersede old studies – or at 
least, of the effects of those studies on decision making. 
The analysis of costs and benefits is an important issue for any IT system. The 
financial benefits obtained by obtaining faster cures can be estimated in terms of 
savings in salary, time and associated costs. If a new out-patients appointment costs 
£70, and a review £50, there are huge savings to be made by minimising reviews 
and reaching a decision at the first clinic visit. To halve the review appointments in a 
single department would save £600,000 per year; alternatively the routine new 
patient waiting time for an appointment could reduce from 8-10 weeks to around 2 
weeks if referral rate remained steady. The positive effect of this on patient 
satisfaction should be significant. 
There are also possibilities of more effective cures or longer lasting cures, by 
reducing erroneous (or, more likely, sub-optimal) decisions made by junior 
clinicians. The financial benefits of this are hard to quantify, but should manifest in 
fewer repeat visits, a reduction in exposure to claims for financial damages, and 
further increases in patient satisfaction. The potential benefits of a system like this 
are therefore greater than the “bottom line” figure of £600,000 p.a. would suggest. 
Balanced against these expected benefits, we must consider the investment required. 
Based on the experience of similar KBS projects, it is estimated that a fully 
functional prototype system would take about six months of effort to complete, 
with a further three months of effort for testing, revision, installation and training. 
This translates roughly to £45,000 of development costs (at a notional rate of 
£60,000 per man year). In addition, there will be hardware and software costs to 
cover. For software, the ideal software package, chosen after a review of available 
packages (see [14]) is CORVID from Exsys, whose list price is $10,000 for a 
development version plus $6,000 for a server-based runtime license. Hardware costs 
and maintenance could be around £3,000, with replacement every three years. Also, 
there will be maintenance of the knowledge base to read clinical studies and keep 
them up to date; allowing two or three days per month, this is estimated at £7,500 
per year. Altogether, these figures produce an initial required investment of around 
£55,000 plus a total annual maintenance cost of approximately £9,000. The system 
would therefore pay for itself in less than 2 months if a 50% reduction in review 
appointments could be achieved across a whole department; it is sensible, however, 
to roll out a prototype first to see how achievable this 50% reduction is.  
There are some further organisational considerations that should be considered 
before the business case for this system is declared to be sound. The system doesn’t 
require any change to organisational responsibilities, unlike some pioneering expert 
systems that aimed to replace doctors rather than supporting them, although it may 
result in in junior consultants being able to take more responsibility in the decision 
process. The task of following surgical protocols is highly unlikely to be phased out 
in the near future. And for a relatively short IT project such as this one, the risk of 
funding being cut before the end of the project is comparatively low. 
5.2 Technical issues 
The technical issues affecting these systems are as follows: 
• Task type: It is clear that clinical protocols are used to carry out a diagnostic 
task, so KBS technology looks like a suitable approach. 
• Telephone test: Protocols are initially drafted in textual form by a consultant 
using a specialised vocabulary, and the decision-making process seems to be 
couched entirely in symbolic terms. This suggests that a KBS approach is 
appropriate for the task. Some terms do refer to the classification of patterns 
seen through a microscope, but these descriptions ("sheets", "follicular cells", 
etc) are manipulated entirely symbolically as far as the protocol is concerned. In 
other words, the pattern recognition (performed in the hospital’s Cytology 
laboratory) is clearly outside the scope of the system. 
• Uncertain knowledge: the knowledge appears to be largely procedural with a 
need to handle some uncertainty at the decision points. 
• Safety-critical: Clearly the task of effective use of protocols is a safety-critical 
task; however, it is impossible to ensure that an expert system is infallible when 
agreement amongst surgeons on what is the “best” procedure is still being 
developed. The aim of this application is to represent the best available 
knowledge, thus improving on the current situation. 
• Verifiability: the knowledge can be verified through clinical trials.  
• Complexity: there is little or no requirement for representing temporal or 
spatial information, cause-effect reasoning or in handling real-time inputs. 
• Time required: while the diagnostic process may be spread out over a long 
period (days or weeks) while test results are awaited, the actual problem-
solving time for the vast majority of cases seems to fall into the 3 – 60 minutes 
range deemed acceptable for a KBS. Very occasionally, consultants will meet 
together to discuss a more complicated case. 
• Interfaces: The aim of this project would be to implement a system that runs 
within an Internet browser, so that it can be used on an intranet or over the 
Internet. All interfaces will therefore be written in HTML. Providing links to 
the studies that provide the evidence for decisions is also required; it is planned 
that hyperlinks to the Medline online abstracting/publications service will 
suffice. Links to electronic medical records are not planned since there is no 
agreed format for these at present.  
5.3 Stakeholder issues 
• Management: The ‘management’ for this project are hospital consultants who 
will also function as domain experts. All the consultants involved seem very 
keen to pursue the project. 
• Users: will initially be junior doctors working for these consultants, so should 
be enthused and encouraged by management. The development of a prototype, 
fielded to a limited number of health care professionals for evaluation purposes, 
will give prospective users a chance to comment on all aspects of the system; 
its usability, its content, and its decision-making. It is also hoped that a medical 
evaluation will be possible, in which some patients are treated according to 
advice given by the system (and approved by the health care professionals), and 
the results are evaluated 
• Developers: University of Edinburgh staff with experience in programming 
KBS are available to develop the system. 
• Experts: see above. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper has shown how a feasibility study can be developed for a knowledge-
based system, focusing on business, technical, and stakeholder-related issues. In 
each section, it has highlighted important factors to consider and explained why 
they are important. A case study was also presented that demonstrated the 
feasibility – with some caveats regarding interfaces, safety criticality and user 
acceptance – of a knowledge based system to support the use of clinical protocols 
in the diagnosis and treatment of thyroid conditions. 
Since the task of developing a feasibility study is itself a knowledge-based 
assessment task, further work in this area might focus on a meta-analysis of these 
various factors. Issues that might be considered are: 
• Priority: which of the factors considered above are showstoppers, and which 
are merely risk factors that can be managed with contingency plans?  
• Tradeoffs: e.g. is it worth making sacrifices in technical feasibility to enhance 
user acceptance of the system?  
• Ideals: what are the features of an ideal KBS application domain? 
• Extensibility: how many of these factors apply to approaches similar to KBS: 
case based reasoning, neural networks, other approaches? 
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